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I. Introduction
Several recent high-profile instances of cyberbullying and online
impersonation have prompted state legislatures across the country to
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take action against this real and growing problem. But like all
attempts to regulate use of the internet, laws governing online
communication must carefully tread the line between protecting
individuals from harm and respecting freedom of speech. On January
1, 2011, California Senate Bill 1411 (now codified at section 528.5 of
the Penal Code) went into effect, creating civil and criminal liability
for “any person who knowingly and without consent credibly
impersonates another actual person through or on an Internet Web
site or by other electronic means for purposes of harming,
2
intimidating, threatening, or defrauding another person.” Shortly
before the statute went into effect, the bill’s author, California State
Senator Joe Simitian, D-Palo Alto, sent out a press release explaining
his motivations in writing the bill: “E-personation is the dark side of
the social networking revolution. Facebook or MySpace pages, emails, texting and comments on Web forums have been used to
humiliate or torment people and even put them in danger . . . Until
3
now, there really has been no deterrent.”
The issue was brought to Senator Simitian’s attention by Carl
Guardino, a constituent and the president and chief executive officer
of the Silicon Valley Leadership Group, which represents several
4
local technology companies. Three years ago, someone created a
fake email address for Guardino and used it to send malicious notes,
harshly criticizing the work of the recipients, to Guardino’s
5
professional contacts. In May 2010, a crude email was sent to a local
6
reporter from a fake Guardino account. The perpetrator of either
1. Examples include: 18-year-old Tyler Clementi of New Jersey (who was outed as
gay by his roommate on the Internet), 15-year-old Billy Lucas of Indiana (who hanged
himself after continued bullying from his peers about his sexuality), and 13-year-old Asher
Brown of Texas (who shot himself after years of abuse online), and 13-year-old Megan
Meirs of Missouri (who hanged herself after the being bullied by the mother of a peer
through a fake MySpace account).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5(a) (Deering 2012). The crime is a misdemeanor, and
penalties are similar to those for other forms of impersonation (i.e., a fine of up to $1,000
and/or up to one year in jail). CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5(d) (Deering 2012). The bill also
allows victims to pursue compensation in civil court. CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5(e)
(Deering 2012).
3. Malicious E-Personation Protection Effective January 1, STATE SENATOR JOE
SIMITIAN (Dec. 22, 2010) http://www.senatorsimitian.com/entry/malicious_e-personation_
protection_effective_january_1/ (hereinafter Simitian I).
4. Maggie Shiels, California Looks to Outlaw Online Impersonation, BBC NEWS
(Aug. 24, 2010, 7:49 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11045070.
5. Andrea Koskey, New Year Brings New Law Targeting Cyberbullying, SAN
FRANCISCO EXAMINER (Dec. 31, 2010, 5:00 AM) http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/2010
/12/new-year-brings-new-law-targeting-cyberbullying#ixzz1ca6vKWdX.
6. Shiels, supra note 5.
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action has not been caught. Guardino told the local paper, “It could
have ruined my reputation . . . Luckily, [the e-mail recipients] know
8
me well enough to know that e-mail was out of character.” A more
outrageous example is that of Guardino’s brother, a science teacher
on the Monterrey peninsula. Someone created a fake Yahoo email
address and Facebook account, and used them to make it seem as
9
though Guardino’s brother was mocking a disabled student. When
Guardino’s brother went to the District Attorney and the County
Sheriff for help, they told him there was nothing they could do under
10
existing state law.
At first glance, the e-personation statute seems perfectly
reasonable: It is short, filled with good intentions, and just applies
existing harassment, intimidation and fraud laws to the relatively
11
recent medium of the Internet. However, a more thorough read
exposes the fallacy of this view and reveals serious reasons for
concern. For one thing, the existing statute does not expressly
exclude acts that might be performed through use of the Internet, so
there is nothing to suggest that the law would not apply in that
12
context. Additionally, the phrase “for the purpose of harming . . .
another person” is incredibly broad and could easily be construed
such that it would criminalize protected speech. Moreover, there is
no objective explanation of what it means to “credibly impersonate”
another actual person. While there is clearly a core of behavior that
is not protected, that behavior is already prohibited by several
existing and long-standing statutory and common law causes of
action, with well-developed bodies of case law behind them to guide
police, prosecutors, judges, and juries in enforcing them.

7. Koskey, supra note 6.
8. Id.
9. Julie Gottlieb, California Criminalizes Online Impersonation (E-personation),
SOCIAL MEDIA NEWS (April 1, 2011) http://socialmedialawnews.com/2011/01/04/
california-criminalizes-online-impersonation-e-personation/; see also Shiels, supra note 5.
10. Shiels, supra note 5.
11. Larry Downes, The Fallacy of “E-personation” Laws, LARRYDOWNES.COM
(June 11, 2010) http://larrydownes.com/the-fallacy-of-%E2%80%9Ce-personation%
E2%80%9 D-laws/.
12. Bill Analysis of S.B. 1411 (as amended May 11, 2010), Assembly Committee on
Judiciary, June 29, 2010, http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_1401-1450/sb_1411_
cfa_20100628_112759_asm_comm.html; “For purposes of this chapter, ‘personal
identifying information’ means any . . . unique electronic data including information
identification number assigned to the person, address or routing code, telecommunication
identifying information or access device.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 530.55(b) (Deering 2012).
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Essentially, the crux of the problem with this law is that the
authors, aware that technology evolves faster than any legislative
body can hope to stay abreast of, wrote the bill so that it is
13
simultaneously
both
under-inclusive
and
over-inclusive.
Consequently, it does not address much of the cyberbullying behavior
it is intended to deter but has the potential to be abused by overzealous prosecutors and litigious plaintiffs with otherwise weak cases.
In other words, this statute will be largely ineffective at best, and a
tool to chill speech at worst. With the enactment of this bill,
California now takes its place among such stalwart defenders of free
14
15
speech as Morocco and India, both of whom have arrested their
citizens for creating Facebook pages for others.
While there are several problems with California’s new epersonation statute, this Note will primarily focus on the implications
for traditionally protected speech resulting from the potential
overbreadth of the phrase “for the purpose of harming . . . another
person” and vagueness of the standards for “credibly impersonate.”
Part II of this Note will provide background on the overbreadth and
vagueness doctrines in Constitutional law, and will review several
existing causes of action that are analogous or related to section 528.5
to show that there is already a well-established body of law in
California prohibiting the behavior that the e-personation statute is
intended to deter. Part III will analyze the core language of the epersonation law and show that it is impermissibly broad and vague,
potentially lowering the threshold for legitimate causes of action such
that enforcement of the law would criminalize or subject to civil
litigation speech that has traditionally been protected by the First
Amendment. Part IV will attempt to provide some guidance on how
the language should be constructed by reviewing courts (or, ideally,
amended by the legislature) to narrow and more clearly define the
vague and ambiguous statutory language. Part V will conclude that
even with narrowing the offending language to limit the statute’s
application to protected speech, the bill covers exactly the same kind
of conduct that is already covered by existing statutes, and that the
behavior at which this statute is directed is best regulated by the
private platforms on which it is conducted.

13. Downes, supra note 12.
14. Facebook Fraudster “Stole Prince’s ID”, CNN.com (Feb. 7, 2008, 8:52 AM)
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/02/07/morocco.identiity/index.html.
15. 1 Arrested For Fake Face Book Profile of Rudy, NEWS4U.CO.IN (April 28, 2010)
http://news4u.co.in/2010/04/1-arrested-for-fake-face-book-profile-of-rudy/.
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II. Background
A. Constitutional Challenges

The First Amendment prohibits unreasonable restrictions on
16
speech by the federal government, and applies to state governments
through incorporation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
17
Amendment.
Attacks on a statute’s constitutionality are either
facial challenges or as-applied challenges. To prevail in a facial
challenge, a plaintiff must establish that the legislation is always, and
under all circumstances, unconstitutional; if successful, the court will
strike the statute down entirely. Sometimes, a court will reject a facial
18
challenge but insinuate that an as-applied challenge could prevail.
To succeed in an as-applied challenge, a plaintiff must show that a
statute is unconstitutional when applied to a particular situation; if
successful, the court will narrow the circumstances in which the
statute may constitutionally be applied without striking it down.
1.

Vagueness Doctrine

The vagueness doctrine, rooted in due process, states that a given
statute is unenforceable and facially invalid if persons of “common
intelligence must necessarily guess as its meaning and differ as to its
application”; in other words, a law is too vague when an average
citizen cannot generally determine what persons are regulated, what
conduct is prohibited or required, or what punishment may be
19
imposed. It protects an individual’s right to live free from fear or the
chilling effect of unpredictable prosecution, and limits the discretion
of the state to initiate criminal prosecutions and selectively enforce
20
The Supreme Court has held that a law threatening
laws.
fundamental First Amendment rights demands a higher degree of
clarity than a statute that does not threaten a constitutionally
21
protected right. However, where a statute could apply to both

16. “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
17. “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . ..” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
18. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd.,
553 U.S. 181 (2008).
19. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
20. Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
21. Keyishian v Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603–04 (1967); Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507, 509–10 (1948); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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protected and unprotected conduct, and the law’s valuable effects
outweigh its potential general harm, a court will strike it down only as
22
applied.
Vagueness does not always lead to a determination of
invalidity—courts may cure a vagueness problem that appears on the
face of the statute through a clarifying judicial interpretation.
2.

Overbreadth Doctrine

The overbreadth doctrine states that a statute is overly broad
(and facially invalid) if, in banning unprotected conduct, it also
23
proscribes protected conduct. Specifically, the doctrine seeks to
24
“strike a balance” between two “competing social costs”:
The
“harmful effects” of “invalidating a law that in some of its
applications is perfectly constitutional,” and the possibility that “the
threat of enforcement of an overbroad law deters people from
25
engaging in constitutionally protected speech.” Given the likelihood
of chilled speech under an overly broad law, the doctrine allows third
party standing on the ground that the statute violates others’ First
26
Amendment rights. Because almost any law regulating speech (even
when the vast majority of prohibited speech is not protected by the
First Amendment) will seem to potentially reach some protected
speech, “the overbreadth of the statute must not only be real but
substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly
27
legitimate sweep” for a court to invalidate it.
Demonstrating
substantial overbreadth invalidates all enforcement of that law, until a
limiting construction or partial invalidation (deletion of the
impermissibly broad part of the law from the remainder of the
28
statute) narrows it to eliminate the threat to protected expression.
To determine whether a statute’s overbreadth is substantial,
courts consider a statute’s application to real-world conduct, not far-

22. Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971); Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
455 U.S. 489, 494–95 (1982); United States v. Nat’l Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963).
23. Lewis Sargentich first analyzed and named the doctrine in his famous note, The
First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, (1970). The Supreme
Court explicitly recognized the doctrine in 1973.
24. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008).
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 483 (1989), and
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 411 (1992).
27. Broadrick v Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612–13, (1973), citing Lewis Sargentich, The
First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, (1970).
28. Canatella v. Stovitz, 365 F.Supp.2d 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2005), (citing Virgina v. Hicks,
539 U.S. 113 (2003)).
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fetched conjectural situations. Accordingly, courts have repeatedly
emphasized that an overbreadth claimant bears the burden of
demonstrating, “from the text of [the law] and from actual fact” that
30
substantial overbreadth exists. Similarly, there must be a “realistic
danger” that the statute itself will “significantly compromise
recognized First Amendment protections of third parties” to be
31
facially challenged on overbreadth grounds.
B. Alternative Causes of Action Available

There are several statutory and common law causes of action in
California that are related to e-personation. False impersonation,
identity theft, defamation, intentional misrepresentation, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, rights of privacy (misappropriation of
likeness or name, right of publicity, and false light) all have elements
or conceptual similarities to the e-personation statute, and are
summarized below.
1.

False Personation

California’s false personation law makes it a crime to falsely
assume the identity of another person in order to cause harm to the
other person or to gain personal benefit, by subjecting the
32
impersonated party to financial loss or civil and criminal liability.
This definition necessarily implies that the person impersonated is a
real person and not a fictitious one (even if the individual is
33
To be violate the statute, the impersonator must, in
deceased).
addition to pretending to be someone, either receive money or

29.
30.
31.
(1984).
32.
33.

See, e.g., Williams, 553 U.S. at 301–02.
Hicks, 539 U.S. at 153.
Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801
CAL. PENAL CODE § 529 (Deering 2012).
Lee v. Super. Ct., 989 P.2d 1277, 1279 (Cal. 2000).
Pen. Code, § 529, by referring to impersonation of “another,”
contemplates impersonation of a real or actual (as opposed to fictitious)
person; it does not follow, however, that a deceased person is not a real
or actual person for purposes of Pen. Code, § 529. Statutes prohibiting
impersonation have two purposes: preventing harm to the person falsely
represented, and ensuring the integrity of judicial and governmental
processes. Both purposes are furthered by construing Pen. Code, § 529,
as applying to impersonation of a deceased person as well as of a living
person, and both would be frustrated by a contrary interpretation of the
statute.

Id.
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property intended for the individual so impersonated, subject the
impersonated to “any suit or prosecution, or to pay any sum of
money, or to incur any charge, forfeiture, or penalty, or whereby any
benefit might accrue to the party personating, or to any other
35
person,” or “marry, or sustain a marriage relationship with
36
another.”
In other words, for this statute to apply, an impersonator must
wage intentional deception and commit one of the additional
37
For example, forging someone’s signature on a
specified acts.
citation booking form or submitting to fingerprints while
impersonating someone else is not a violation of this statute, because
38
False
the impersonation was inextricably part of the action.
39
personation comes with a $10,000 fine, a year in prison, or both.
Because the statute requires an additional act beyond identifying
oneself falsely there are two defenses: (1) the impersonator did not
commit one of the specified additional acts, and (2) that the
individual impersonated won’t be subject to any harm, and no one is
benefitting from the impersonation. However, the statute does not
require an actual harm or benefit to have occurred, just the potential
40
to create one.

34.
35.
36.
37.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 530 (Deering 2012).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 529(a) (Deering 2012).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 528 (Deering 2012).
People v. Rathert, P.3d 700, 707 (2000)
…[S]ection 529, paragraph 3 [California’s false impersonation law],
unlike public welfare offenses, does not dispense with a mental element.
One does not violate paragraph 3 merely by happening to resemble
another person. Rather, one must intentionally engage in a deception
that may fairly be described as noninnocent behavior, even if, in some
instances, it might not stem from an evil motive.

Id.
38. These examples are taken from People v. Stacy, 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 312, 317 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2010); People v. Cole, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 788, 790 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); People v.
Robertson, 273 Cal. Rptr. 209, 210 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (overruled on other grounds).
39. CAL. PENAL CODE § 528 (Deering 2012).
40. “. . .does any other act whereby, if done by the person falsely personated,
he might, in any event, become liable to any suit or prosecution, or to pay any sum of
money, or to incur any charge, forfeiture, or penalty, or whereby any benefit might accrue
to the party personating, or to any other person.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 529 (Deering
2012) (emphasis added).
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Identity Theft and Counterfeit Official Documents

Identity theft is the taking of another person’s personally
41
identifying information for use in a criminal or deceptive manner.
California’s identity theft statute allows for criminal charges when
someone “willfully obtains personal identifiable information to use
for any unlawful purpose,” including, but not limited to, “obtain[ing],
or attempt[ing] to obtain, credit, goods, services, or medical
42
information in the name of another person.” Specifically, the statute
prohibits four types of identity theft: (1) intentionally obtaining
someone’s personal identifying information and using that
43
information for any unlawful purpose without that person’s consent;
(2) acquiring or retaining possession someone’s personal identifying
information (without his or her consent) with the intent to commit a
fraud; (3) selling, transferring, or providing a third party with
someone’s personal identifying information (without his or her
consent) with the intent to commit a fraud; and (4) selling,
transferring, or providing a third party with someone’s personal
identifying information (without his or her consent) with the actual
44
knowledge that the information will be used to commit a fraud.
Somewhat appended to the identity theft law is a prohibition on
the manufacture, sale, offer for sale, or transfer of any document
purporting to be a government-issued identification card or driver’s
license (but not amounting to counterfeit), which by virtue of the
wording or appearance thereon could reasonably deceive an ordinary
45
person into believing that it is issued by a government agency.
3.

Defamation

In California, defamation (known as “libel” in written from, and
46
47
“slander” if uttered orally), is defined by both statute and case law.

41. CAL. PENAL CODE § 530.5 (Deering 2012).
42. Id.
43. California courts have found that “unlawful” does not only refer to criminal
activity, but to any act prohibited by some type of law—even a civil one such as
defamation. E.g., In re Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 49, 54 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
44. CAL. PENAL CODE § 530.5 (Deering 2012). Here, the term “fraud” means a
deliberate act that is designed to (1) secure an unfair or unlawful gain, or (2) cause
another person to suffer a loss, as in the false personation statute.
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 529.5 (Deering 2012).
46. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 44, 45(a), and 46 (Deering 2012).
47. See e.g., Cunningham v. Simpson, 461 P.2d 39, 42 (Cal. 1969); Bindrim v. Mitchell,
155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 38 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Noral v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 104 P.2d 860, 863
(Cal. 1940); Hellar v. Bianco, 244 P.2d 757, 759 (Cal. 1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 577, 592, 564A, 580B (1977).
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The elements of a defamation claim are: (1) publication to one other
than the person defamed (2) of a false statement of fact which is
understood as (3) being of and concerning the plaintiff, and (4) has a
natural tendency to injure the plaintiff’s reputation or which causes
48
“special damage.” Public figures must additionally prove “actual
49
malice.” As a matter of law, in cases involving public figures or
matters of public concern, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove
50
falsity in a defamation action. In cases involving matters of purely
private figures concern, the burden of proving truth is on the
51
defendant. One important aspect of a defamation case is whether a
52
Jocular
false statement about someone is likely to be believed.
53
intent alone will not relieve the author/publisher of liability, but if
the statement is too bizarre or hyperbolic to be credible, and readers
54
will likely interpret it as a joke, then the suit is unlikely to succeed.
A private plaintiff is with a prima facie case of libel per se may
55
presume damages, otherwise, the plaintiff must prove “special
damages,” which are concrete, provable, and a direct result of the
56
defamation.

48. Robert Kavanaugh, Elements of a Defamation Claim: 4-45 California Torts §
45.04, MATTHEW BENDER & CO., INC., 2011. Last visited Nov. 7, 2011.
49. Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 916 (Cal. 1969).
50. Nizam-Aldine v. City of Oakland, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781, 786–90 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996) (“whether . . . speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by
[the expression’s] content, form, and context . . . as revealed by the whole record”).
51. Smith v. Maldonado, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 397, 403 n.5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
52. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52–54 (1988).
53. Arno v. Stewart, 54 Cal. Rptr. 392, 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966); Menefee v. Codman,
317 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Cal. 1957).
54. Arno, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
55.
[T]he jury ‘also may award plaintiff presumed general damages.’
Presumed damages ‘are those damages that necessarily result from the
publication of defamatory matter and are presumed to exist. They
include reasonable compensation for loss of reputation, shame,
mortification, and hurt feeling. No definite standard or method of
calculation is prescribed by law by which to fix reasonable compensation
for presumed damages, and no evidence of actual harm is required.’
Sommer v. Gabor, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 235, 246 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995), (internal citations
omitted); see also 23 CAL. JUR. 3D DAMAGES § 171. Libel per se is the publication of a
false statement about another which accuses him/her of a crime, immoral acts, inability to
perform his/her profession, having a loathsome disease (like syphilis), or dishonesty in
business. Such claims are considered so obviously harmful that malice need not be proved
to obtain a judgment for “general damages,” and not just specific losses.
56. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 48(a) (Deering 2012); 23 CAL. JUR. 3D DAMAGES § 152.
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Intentional Misrepresentation or “Fraud”

Under California law, wrongful actions can be characterized as
57
civil “fraud” under the theory of intentional misrepresentation. The
general elements of a cause of action for fraud or deceit are (1)
misrepresentation (in the form of false representation, concealment,
or nondisclosure) of a material fact; (2) knowledge of falsity or lack of
reasonable ground for belief in the truth of the representation
(scienter); (3) intent to induce reliance; (4) actual and justifiable
58
reliance by plaintiff; and (5) resulting damage. It is not enough that
the victim was told a lie; the victim must also be able to prove some
59
type of measurable damage resulted from the lie.
A false statement or omission is actionable only if the plaintiff’s
60
reliance was justifiable or reasonable. The reasonableness of the
reliance is ordinarily a question of fact. However, if reasonable minds
can come to only one conclusion based on the facts, whether a party’s
61
reliance was justified may be decided as a matter of law. Reliance is
not justifiable if it is unreasonable in light of the plaintiff’s
62
intelligence, experience, and business ventures. The test is whether
or not it was reasonable under these particular circumstances for this
63
particular plaintiff to have relied on the representation.

57. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (Deering 2012).
58. Peter R. J. Thompson, 3-40 California Torts § 40.02: Elements of Tort of Fraud or
Deceit, MATTHEW BENDER & COMPANY, INC., 2011. See Orient Handel v. United States
Fid. & Guar. Co., 237 Cal. Rptr. 667, 671 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Hackethal v. Nat’l Cas. Co.,
234 Cal. Rptr. 853, 857 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). See also CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1572(1), (2),
1710(1), (2) (Deering 2012); Mirkin v. Wasserman, 858 P.2d 568, 570 (Cal. 1993) (actual
reliance); Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., 220 Cal. Rptr. 507, 513 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)
(justifiable reliance); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Keenan, 216 Cal. Rptr. 318, 334–35
(Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (knowledge of falsity, justifiable reliance); Hilliard v. A. H. Robins
Co., 196 Cal. Rptr. 117, 144 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (knowledge of falsity); Hart v. Browne,
163 Cal. Rptr. 356, 361–62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (knowledge of falsity); Gold v. L.A.
Democratic League, 122 Cal. Rptr. 732, 739 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (recklessness or lack of
reasonable ground for belief in truth of representation).
59. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1709 (Deering 2012); Gonsalves v. Hodgson, 237 P.2d 656,
662 (Cal. 1951).
60. Seeger v. Odell, 115 P.2d 977, 980 (Cal. 1941); Hackethal, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 857;
Wagner v. Benson, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516, 522 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
61. Guido v. Koopman, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437, 440 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
62. Wagner, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 522; Winn v. McCulloch Corp., 131 Cal. Rptr. 597, 601
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976); see Chi. Title Ins. Co., 220 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
63. Kruse v. Bank of Am., 248 Cal. Rptr. 217, 226 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (testimony
concerning one’s own reliance is legally insufficient if that reliance is without justification;
plaintiff’s misguided belief in statement on which no reasonable person would rely was not
justifiable).
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As a general rule negligence of the plaintiff is no defense to an
intentional tort .. . . Nor is a plaintiff held to the standard of
precaution or of minimum knowledge of a hypothetical,
reasonable man . . .. Exceptionally gullible or ignorant people
have been permitted to recover from defendants who took
advantage of them in circumstances where persons of normal
intelligence would not have been misled . . . however, even an
unsophisticated victim may not put faith in representations
which are preposterous, or which are shown by facts within his
observation to be so patently and obviously false that he must
64
have closed his eyes to avoid discovery of the truth.
5.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

California has long recognized the right to recover damages for
the intentional infliction of mental or emotional distress (“IIED”). To
win an IIED suit, plaintiff must prove: (1) outrageous conduct by the
defendant; (2) that the defendant intended to cause, or recklessly
disregarded of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (3)
suffering severe or extreme emotional distress by the plaintiff; and (4)
actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the
65
defendant’s outrageous conduct. Consequently, a plaintiff may
recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress only when he
66
or she has, in fact, suffered severe emotional distress. “Severe”
emotional distress is that which is “substantial” or “enduring” as
67
opposed to “trivial” or “transitory,” and has been defined as
“emotional distress of such substantial quantity or enduring quality
that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to
68
endure it.” It may consist of “any highly unpleasant mental reaction
such as fright, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger,
69
chagrin, disappointment or worry.”
Both the intensity and the
duration of the plaintiff’s emotional distress are factors to be
70
considered in determining whether it is severe.
California was the first state (and one of the few) that allows
monetary recovery for de minimus physical injury (i.e., unnecessary

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Seeger v. Odell, 115 P.2d 977, 980–81 (Cal. 1941).
Alcorn v. Anbro Eng’g., Inc., 468 P.2d 216, 218 (Cal. 1970).
Agarwal v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58, 71 (Cal. 1979).
Girard v. Ball, 178 Cal. Rptr. 406, 414 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
Schild v. Rubin, 283 Cal. Rptr. 533, 537–38 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
Fletcher v. W. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
Id. at 90.
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medications and medical tests) if the outcome was foreseeable, and
emotional distress alone (even in the absence of any physical injury to
the plaintiff), in cases involving extreme and outrageous intentional
71
invasions of one’s mental and emotional tranquility.
6.

Invasion of Privacy Torts

Unlike a defamation claim, the invasion of privacy torts do not
protect a plaintiff’s interest in his or her reputation. Instead, the
wrong inflicted by an invasion of privacy is a direct injury to the
plaintiff’s feelings and peace of mind, and compensation is awarded
for that injury, not for loss of standing in the eyes of others. There
are four categories of privacy invasion: intrusion of solitude and
seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, misappropriation of name
or likeness, and false light. The latter two are relevant to this
discussion.
a.

Misappropriation of Likeness or Name and Right of Publicity

Thirty years ago, California adopted Dean Prosser’s elements for
72
the tort of misappropriation of name or likeness: “(1) the
defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of
plaintiff’s name or likeness to defendant’s advantage, commercially or
73
otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury.” However,
harm to the plaintiff is typically presumed as long as the first three
elements are demonstrated. Courts have held that any invasion of a
legal right is an injury satisfying the fourth element, although without
proof of material harm the plaintiff may only be entitled to nominal
74
damages. In one case, a court held that any violation should be
recoverable even if the injury was mental and subjective; therefore
even the unauthorized use of a person’s name is an actionable
75
invasion of the plaintiff’s rights (even if the injury was slight). In this
vein, the law does not require that the unauthorized use or
publication of a person’s name or picture suggest an endorsement or
76
Likewise,
association with the injured person to be actionable.

71. State Rubbish Collectors Assn. v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282, 284–286 (Cal. 1952).
72. Eastwood v. Super. Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Super. Ct. of L.A. 1983). See also
Prosser, LAW OF TORTS ß 117 (4th ed. 1971); Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d
686, 692 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying California law).
73. Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 347. See also Prosser, LAW OF TORTS ß 117 (4th ed.
1971); Newcombe, 157 F.3d 686 (applying California law).
74. Fairfield v. Am. Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194, 198 (Cal. 1955).
75. Id. at 197.
76. Eastwood, 198 Cal, Rptr. at 347.
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misrepresenting a plaintiff’s authorship or attributing statements to
him or her for the purpose of advertising some business enterprise
77
may also be actionable.
However, even if a plantiff establishes a prima facie case, the First
Amendment requires that the right to be protected from
unauthorized publicity be balanced against the public interest in the
78
dissemination of news and information. Thus, publication of matters
in the public interest, which rests on the right of the public to know
and the freedom of the press to tell it, is not ordinarily actionable.
This public matters exemption is a broad one; a matter in the public
interest is not restricted to current events, and may extend to
79
reproduction of past events.
A related tort is the right of publicity, defined by J. Thomas
McCarthy, as “the inherent right of every human being to control the
80
commercial use of his or her identity.” The right of publicity does
not prevent mere reputational damage; it can only be used to prevent
someone else from improperly profiting from a celebrity’s image,
thereby preventing the celebrity from exploiting his or her own image
81
in that context. In California, the right of publicity is protected by
82
statute and applies almost exclusively to celebrities. The elements of
a right of publicity claim are: (1) the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s
identity, (2) appropriation of the plaintiff’s name or likeness to the
defendant’s commercial advantage, (3) lack of consent, and (4)
83
To prevail, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her
injury.
“name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness” was used “on or in
products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or
selling, or soliciting purchases of products, merchandise, goods or

77. Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 127 P.2d 577, 580–81 (Cal. 1942).
78. Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 314–315 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001), review denied, (Mar. 27, 2002).
79. Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 643 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995), as modified, (May 30, 1995).
80. See J. Thomas McCarthy, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2011).
81. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §3344 (Deering 2012) (statutory right of publicity only
applies to uses for the “purposes of advertising or selling”) (emphasis added). This
definition has been accepted by most courts and explicitly incorporated into many of the
right of publicity statutes. See also, Jim Henson Prods., Inc. v. John T. Brady & Assocs.,
Inc., 867 F. Supp. 175, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“The right to publicity protects that value as
property, and its infringement is a commercial, rather than a personal tort.”) The
Supreme Court also appears to subscribe to this definition; see Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573–74 (1977).
82. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (Deering 2012).
83. Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 313 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001), review denied, (Mar. 27, 2002).
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services, without such person’s prior consent.”
California courts
85
have extended protection beyond name, voice and image to include
86
a celebrity’s general “identity.”
The unauthorized use of a celebrity’s name, photograph, or
likeness on a publication and in broadcasted advertisements, in
connection with the publication of a false (but nondefamatory)
87
88
article, is actionable under both common law and statutory law.
This type of “commercial exploitation” is not privileged or protected
89
by the Constitution.
However, a public figure can only recover
damages for noncommercial exploitation of his or her image by
showing that the defendant acted with reckless disregard for the truth
90
or a high degree of awareness of probable falsity.
b. False Light

Publicity that places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye
91
constitutes an invasion of privacy. To recover under a false light
claim, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant knowingly (or
recklessly) made and publicized a false representation that would be
92
highly offensive to a reasonable person. A false light claim, like
libel, exposes a person to contempt, ridicule, or humiliation and
93
assumes the audience will recognize it as such. The violation can
manifest in several ways.
For example, the unauthorized use of plaintiff’s picture to
illustrate an article in which the plaintiff is falsely characterized may
94
constitute an invasion of privacy. However, if a photograph is a fair
and accurate depiction of the plaitniff in the scene in question, albeit

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (Deering 2012).
Id.
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc, 971 F.2d 1395, 1397–99 (9th Cir. 1991).
Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Super. Ct. of L.A. 1983).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344; see 6A CAL. JUR. ASSAULT AND OTHER WILLFUL
TORTS § 133.
89. Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
90. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001).
91. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431 (Cal. 1979); Forsher v. Bugliosi,
608 P.2d 716, 725 (Cal. 1980).
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
93. M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 514–15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
94. Gill v. Curtis Publ’g. Co., 239 P.2d 630, 635 (Cal. 1952) (holding that plaintiffs
stated a cause of action for invasion of privacy based on the unauthorized use of a
photograph taken of plaintiffs in an amorous pose at their place of business and used to
illustrate a magazine article treating various types of love in such a manner as to depict
plaintiffs as immoral persons); M.G., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 514–15.
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portraying the plaintiff in less than flattering light, it is not
actionable—so long as the photograph is not highly offensive to
95
persons of ordinary sensibilities. Similarly, falsely attributing some
statement or belief to a plaintiff—such as the unauthorized signing of
his or her name to a letter that would cast doubt on his or her
96
97
character — may may also be actionable under this tort.
However, publicity that places one in a false light is not
necessarily an invasion of privacy where it discloses no fact the person
98
wishes to keep secret relative to his or her private life. A false light
99
cause of action is in substance equivalent to a libel claim and,
therefore, must meet the same requirements, including notice and a
demand for retraction as required by statute in actions for damages
for the publication of a libel in a newspaper or of slander by a radio
100
101
broadcast, and the necessity to show malice.

III. Analysis
The e-personation statute is susceptible to challenge under both
the overbreadth doctrine for the phrase “harming . . . another person”
and the vagueness doctrine for the ambiguity of the term “credibly
impersonate” another person.
A. Constitutional Problems

When interpreting statutes, California state courts must give
precise meaning to otherwise unconstitutionally vague terms (even if
102
doing so means that a court overturns prior precedent).
A law is
unconstitutionally vague if it is so ambiguous and lacking in criteria
95. Aisenson v. Am. Broad. Co., 269 Cal. Rptr. 379, 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
96. Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 127 P.2d 577, 580–581 (Cal. 1942).
97. Fairfield v. Am. Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194, 197–98 (Cal. 1955).
98. Patton v. Royal Indus., Inc., 70 Cal. Rptr. 44, 48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (holding
that there was no invasion of privacy where defendant, the former employer of plaintiff,
sent letters to customers for plaintiff’s type of work advising that plaintiff had been
terminated and replaced by workers with more knowledge and experience, where the
letter disclosed no facts relative to plaintiff’s private life, revealed no secrets of plaintiff,
and, although it placed plaintiff in a false light by reflecting on his skill and ability, was
defamatory only in reflecting on the professional standing of plaintiff in the public view).
99. Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 921 n.16 (Cal. 1969); Aisenson, 269 Cal. Rptr.
379, 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
100. Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 483 P.2d 34, 39 (Cal. 1971) (referring to
Civ. Code § 48a); Selleck v. Globe Int’l, Inc., 212 Cal. Rptr. 838, 845 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985) (referring to Civ. Code § 48a).
101. Kapellas, 459 P.2d at 924–25; Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 44; Selleck, 212 Cal. Rptr. at
845; Aisenson, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
102. Pryor v. Mun. Ct., 599 P.2d 636, 640–41 (Cal. 1979).
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that it not only fails to adequately describe the conduct it requires (or
prohibits) to those who must observe it, but also allows police, judges,
and juries to resolve basic policy matters on an ad hoc and subjective
basis, with the ensuing likelihood of arbitrary and discriminatory
103
That said, some ambiguity in statutory language is
application.
acceptable (and arguably inevitable), so it is not fatal if a statutory
term or word does not have a universally recognized meaning or
there is a matter of degree in the definition. A statute will be deemed
sufficiently precise if its meaning can be fairly established by
references to similar statutes, other judicial interpretations, to the
common law, the dictionary, or a common and generally accepted
104
meaning.
To overcome a statutory vagueness challenge, a criminal statute
must be definite enough to provide both a standard of conduct for
those whose activities are proscribed as well as a standard for police
105
enforcement and for ascertainment of guilt. Although the standards
for certainty in a civil statute are less exacting than the standards for a
criminal statute, both must be sufficiently clear as to give a fair
warning of the conduct prohibited and provide a standard against
106
which conduct can be uniformly judged by courts. Because the epersonation statute creates both civil and criminal liability, the
language should be held to the higher criminal standard.
1.

Analyzing the Overbreadth of “Harm”

Although Senator Simitian says the law will only be used to stop
107
“pernicious” attackers, the statute’s language is broad enough to
allow a much more expansive application. The four purposes
enumerated (“harming, intimidating, threatening, or defrauding”)
cover a large spectrum of possibility—and the bill neither provides a
definition for what it means to have the purpose of “harming,” nor
clarifies if “another person” refers only to the person whose identity
has been usurped, or includes some third party. Because the

103. Meyers v. Arcata Union High School Dist., 75 Cal. Rptr. 68, 74–75 (Cal. Ct. App.
1969), In re H.C., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793, 794–95 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). See also Bowland v.
Mun. Ct., 134 Cal. Rptr. 630, 636–37 (Cal. 1976), In re Sheena K., 153 P.3d 282, 293 (Cal.
2007).
104. In re Mariah T., 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 542, 547 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
105. People v. Morgan, 170 P.3d 129, 137 (Cal. 2007).
106. State Bd. of Equalization v. Wirick, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 919, 925 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001).
107. STATE SENATOR JOE SIMITIAN, Fact Sheet Senate Bill 1411: Criminal “EPersonation”, http://www.senatorsimitian.com/images/uploads/SB_1411_Fact_Sheet.pdf.
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standards for “intimidating” and “threatening” behavior are
subjective (i.e., whether the victim believed they were in danger) and
require only testimony of a victim’s subjective state, whereas
“defrauding” is objective, and requires proof of monetary damages to
recover, it is also unclear what types of harm (e.g., emotional,
physical, or financial) are actionable, and how much harm has is
required (or intended) for a prima facie case. Additionally, it is
difficult to determine exactly which acts of impersonation are
threatening, intimidating, or defrauding, and reasonable people will
disagree whether an impersonation falls within these categories.
The problem under a broad definition that includes emotional or
reputational harm, is that critical satire or parody (which are
otherwise protected) could be actionable. Satire is the use of irony,
sarcasm, ridicule, or similar devices to expose, denounce, or deride
108
vice and folly in a target; and the line between that and emotional
or reputational harm is fuzzy at best. The object of satire is usually to
provoke its targets to improve or alter their behavior (at the very
least to publicly expose their shortcomings) through ridicule—and
therefore, is effective only when it causes its target to feel sufficiently
109
embarrassed to change future behavior. However, embarrassment
110
is not the kind of harm normally allowed as basis for a lawsuit.
As the law stands today, a public figure may not recover damages
for emotional harm caused by the publication of a parody he or she
finds offensive unless it contains a false statement of fact that satisfies
the actual malice standard (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard
111
In the Hustler case, a nationally circulated
for truth or falsity).
magazine printed a parody article suggesting Jerry Falwell (a
nationally known minister and an active political and social
commentator) and his mother were drunks, had an incestuous
rendezvous in an outhouse, and that Falwell was a hypocrite who only
112
preached under the influence. That the material might be deemed

108. Satire definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/satire (last viewed Jan. 20, 2012).
109. Robert Harris, The Purpose and Method of Satire, (originally published Aug. 20,
1990, version date Oct. 24, 2004), http://www.virtualsalt.com/satire.htm.
110. Corynne McSherry, “E-Personation” Bill Could Be Used to Punish Online Critics,
Undermine First Amendment Protections for Parody, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION (Aug. 22, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/08/e-personation-billcould-be-used-punish-online; see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,
910 (1982) (“Speech does not lose its protected character . . . simply because it may
embarrass others or coerce them into action.”).
111. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 49 (1988).
112. Id. at 48.
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outrageous and that it might have been intended to cause severe
emotional distress are not enough to overcome First Amendment
113
protections. Vicious attacks on public figures in the form of
cartoons, the Court noted, are part of the American tradition of satire
114
and parody, a tradition of speech that would be hamstrung if public
115
figures could sue them anytime the satirist caused distress.
Although the justices conceded that this ad was not technically a
political cartoon, they were unable to find a standard that could
116
separate this kind of ad from the others. The Court also noted that
vague terms like “outrageousness” have an “inherent subjectiveness”
about them, which “allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the
jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a
117
particular expression.”
The Supreme Court recently weighed in on the balance between
First Amendment protection of speech on matters of public concern
made peaceably in a public space causing significant psychological
118
and emotional harm to a private individual.
The Court defined
“matters of public concern” broadly as “a subject of general interest
119
and of value and concern to the public.” The majority opinion in
Snyder did suggest that personally directed harassment, such as
speech to a small number of people, like the publication of someone’s
sex tape, would be “private speech” and more readily amenable to
120
regulation based on its content. Taken together, Hustler and Snyder
suggest that the First Amendment guarantees trump the feelings of
those harmed by speech that crosses the line into harassment, as long
as the speech at issue concerns a public matter (which has been
broadly defined), and that otherwise actionable speech is immunized
by the First Amendment when interspersed with protected speech.
Another issue with this statute is that statements of truth, albeit
made with harmful intent, are traditionally protected against
defamation claims, but seem to be actionable under the e-personation
statute. The truth defense in defamation cases rests on First
Amendment principles that one cannot be prosecuted for saying the
truth. Likewise, a statement of opinion (as opposed to one of fact) is
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 53.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 55.
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220–21 (2011).
Id. at 1216.
Id.
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protected against defamation claims. Courts articulated a standard
for distinguishing opinion from fact which relies on use of language
121
and provability. For a statement to qualify as opinion, the factual
basis of the statement must be clearly disclosed, and any statement of
opinion without underlying facts (or implies the existence of
undisclosed false facts) is to be treated as a per se factual assertion
122
False statements of fact couched in an opinion
and actionable.
context are actionable unless clearly set aside by “loose, figurative or
123
hyperbolic language.” Generally, a statement is measured “not so
much by its effect when subjected to the critical analysis of a mind
trained in the law, but by the natural and probable effect upon the
mind of the average reader” in determining whether it is defamatory,
124
Consequently, the e-personation statute
and therefore actionable.
seems to criminalize an otherwise protected activity solely on the
basis of its medium. For example, imagine someone created a
“credible” fake Facebook profile for another person and used it to
reveal embarrassing, but truthful, facts about that person with the
intent to harm them. Under defamation law, this conduct would not
be actionable, but under the e-personation law, it would.
Finally, although Senator Simitian claims that the e-personation
statute only updates the existing law against false personation to take
account of the Internet, the statute actually does something slightly
different. In reality, this statute expands the crime to one against
both the target of the false impersonation as well as against the person
falsely impersonated. Under the existing false personation statute, the
crime is only against the person whose identity is assumed; in
contrast, this law provides an additional civil remedy for persons who
are harmed, intimidated, threatened, or defrauded by this
125
impersonation, even if they are not the person impersonated. Even
more worrisome is that under the definitions in the statute, “person”
126
This
means not only humans, but various business forms as well.
means that if someone impersonates a corporation to satirize them,
121. Morningstar, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547, 556–57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
122. Morningstar, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 554.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 553 (citations omitted).
125. ASSEMB. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, BILL ANALYSIS OF S.B. 1411 (as amended May
11, 2010), STATE OF CAL. ASSEMB. 2009–2010, available at http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/0910/bill/sen/sb_1401-1450/sb_1411_cfa_20100628_112759_asm_comm.html.
126. “For purposes of this chapter, ‘person’ means a natural person, living or
deceased, firm, association, organization, partnership, business trust, company,
corporation, limited liability company, or public entity, or any other legal entity.” CAL.
PENAL CODE § 530.55(a). (Deering 2012).

2012]

PARODY OR IDENTITY THEFT

295

they could be liable to that company and subject to criminal
prosecution.
2.

Analyzing the Vagueness of “Credibly”

The statute defines “credible” as “if another person would
reasonably believe, or did reasonably believe, that the defendant was
127
According to the
or is the person who was impersonated.”
legislative history, the scope of the statute was originally much
128
129
broader, and “credibly” was later added to narrow it so it would
130
not undermine online activism and protected speech. The problem
with this position is two-fold: (1) the fact that the statute provides a
definition for “credible” is not dispositive as to its clarity, and (2)
“credibility” is inherently subjective and therefore a poor standard by
which to objectively judge conduct.
In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court found that, “just because a
definition including [several] limitations is not vague, it does not
131
follow that one of those limitations, standing by itself, is not vague.”
In that case, the Court unanimously voted to strike down portions of
the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) for violating the First
132
133
Amendment because the “many ambiguities” of the language in
the Act regarding the scope of its coverage “lack[ed] the precision
that the First Amendment requires” when regulating content of
134
The justices found the undefined terms “indecent” and
speech.
“patently offensive” problematic because they “provoke uncertainty
among speakers about how the two standards relate to each other and
135
just what they mean.” The vagueness of content-based regulation,
combined with its increased deterrent effect as a criminal statute,
raised special First Amendment concerns for the Justices because of
136
its “obvious chilling effect on free speech.” The Court also found
that this increased deterrent effect, coupled with the “risk of
127. CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5(b) (Deering 2012).
128. CAL. S., S.B. 1411, INTRODUCED, CAL. S. 2009–2010, available at http://leginfo.ca.
gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_1401-1450/sb_1411_bill_20100219_introduced.pdf.
129. CAL. S., S.B. 1411, AMENDED (APR. 28, 2010), CAL. S. 2009–2010, April 28, 2010,
available at http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_1401-1450/sb_1411_bill_20100428_
amended_sen_v97.pdf.
130. Simitian, supra note 4.
131. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 873 (1997).
132. Id. at 883.
133. Id. at 870.
134. Id. at 874.
135. Id. at 871–72.
136. Id.
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discriminatory enforcement” of vague regulations, poses greater First
137
Amendment concerns than those implicated by the civil regulation”
The “vague contours” of the Act’s scope “unquestionably silences
some speakers whose messages would be entitled to constitutional
protection,” and that the Act’s burden on protected speech “cannot
be justified if it could be avoided by a more carefully drafted
138
statute.”
In another case, the Court struck down on vagueness grounds a
criminal statute defining a person as a “gangster” if he was without
lawful employment, had been either convicted at least three times for
disorderly conduct or had been convicted of any other crime, and was
139
“known to be a member of a gang of two or more persons.” The
Court observed that neither common law nor the statute gave the
words “gang” or “gangster” definite meaning, that the enforcing
agencies and courts were free to construe the terms broadly or
narrowly, and that the phrase “known to be a member” was
140
ambiguous.
Although the e-personation statute incorporates the “reasonable
person” standard (which measures conduct against a hypothetical
person who “exercises the degree of attention, knowledge,
intelligence and judgment that society requires of its members for the
141
protection of their own and of others’ interests”), this definition
does not elucidate any sort of objective workable criteria which would
make someone’s online portrayal of another credible. There is a
fundamental problem with the qualifier “credibly,” in that it is
virtually impossible to assess someone’s belief against an objective,
“reasonable” person because such evaluations will always be contextbased and fact-specific. Even if one were to accept this subjective
standard—the bill doesn’t define who “another person” (to whom the
impersonation must seem credible) is: someone with personal
knowledge of the impersonation victim or a third party without such
knowledge who stumbles across the impersonation? This matters
because the degree to which someone knows the victim will guide
whether they find the impersonation credible or not. A plain
language reading of the e-personation statute would allow an
137. Id. at 872.
138. Id. at 874.
139. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 454–455 (1939).
140. Id. at 458.
141. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1380 (9th ed. 2009). Black’s comments that the
reasonable person “acts sensibly, does things without serious delay, and takes proper but
not excessive precautions.”
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individual to bring a lawsuit merely because a stranger was duped by
an impersonation that, to anyone with personal knowledge of the
plaintiff, would not be credible—regardless of whether any actual
harm resulted.
Finally, the argument that credibility is a sufficient filter to protect
free speech misses the point—successful parody, for example,
depends on initial credibility. A parody is a work created to mock,
comment on, or make fun of an original work, its subject, author,
style, or some other target, by means of imitation. Parody can
provide a nuanced means for expressing critical sentiments and for
openly exploring controversial subjects, but it often depends heavily
on the readers ability to identify and understand the irony in the work
because the device does not work when blatantly labeled as such.
This subtlety that gives parody its utility also contributes to its
greatest drawback: Implied meanings are often lost on their intended
audience. In textual communication this difficulty is magnified by the
absence of any nonverbal queues that might imply a nonliteral
interpretation.
As an example of just how easy it is for something that is clearly a
parody to be considered “credible” by another person, consider the
suspension and subsequent removal of the @ceoSteveJobs Twitter
142
The account churned out tongue-in-cheek tweets poking
account.
fun at Apple (and its late founder) such as, “It’s official. The iPad
143
“When Chuck
now comes in greater variety than my clothing.”
144
Norris holds the iPhone 4 the signal increases,” and “Women love
145
playing with my nano.” It seems unlikely that anyone familiar with
Steve Jobs or Apple, Inc. (and its notoriously well-controlled public
relations department) could reasonably believe that this account was
genuine. But in fact, someone did—on July 28, 2010, the Daily Mail,
(the United Kingdom’s second largest newspaper) quoted the account
as the real Steve Jobs in a story about customer dissatisfaction with

142. On March 1, 2011, Twitter suspended the @ceoSteveJobs Twitter account (which
had approximately 460,000 followers and more than 650 tweets at the time of deletion)
and renamed it @fakeceoSteve. Don Reisinger, Twitter Suspends Fake Steve Jobs Account,
Then Backtracks, CNET NEWS (Mar. 2, 2011, 7:40 AM), http://news.cnet.com/830113506_3-20038220-17.html.
143. Twitter status, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/#!/FakeceoSteve/status/4307866
7148066816 (now defunct).
144. Twitter status, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/#!/ceoSteveJobs/status/20794014540
(now defunct).
145. Twitter status, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/#!/ceoSteveJobs/status/3759037
5245950976 (now defunct).
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146

the iPhone 4 despite the fact that the account’s biography explicitly
147
stated it was a parody. This illustrates the pitfalls of the “credible”
standard as defined in the statute; even where the parody was labeled,
a professional and well-established news outlet could be—and
actually was—mistaken about the veracity of a parody account.
The Yes Men, a group of political activists, provide an example of
the kind of political speech that may be chilled by the e-personation
statute. The Yes Men impersonate entities that they dislike (typically
corporations and public officials) in a practice they call “identity
correction” to raise awareness of what they consider problematic
148
social and political issues. And, illustrating the concern that overly
sensitive litigants may abuse this new law, the targets of the criticism
149
For
have responded with aggressive legal threats and lawsuits.
example, in October 2009, The Yes Men issued a press release and
staged a press conference as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in which
the Chamber ostensibly reversed its position and promised to stop
150
lobbying against strong climate change legislation. The hoax fooled
151
a lot of reporters and attracted a lot of media attention. As part of
152
the stunt, The Yes Men published a parody website resembling the
Chamber’s, which featured a fake statement by chief executive officer
153
Thomas J. Donahue about the supposed change of policy.
In the
middle of the press conference, a Chamber of Commerce
representative rushed into the room and revealed that the Chamber’s
position on climate change legislation had not in fact changed.
Afterwards, the Chamber of Commerce aggressively took action,
first sending a takedown notice under the Digital Milenium Copyright
Act to The Yes Men’s upstream service provider demanding removal
of the parody website (which was later disputed), then filing suit in
federal district court against members of The Yes Men for trademark

146. Charles Arthur, Daily Mail Fooled by Fake Steve Jobs Tweet on iPhone 4 Recall,
GUARDIAN.CO.UK (June 28, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/jun/27/dailymail-twitter-jobs-iphone-mistake.
147. The biography section read, “I don’t care what you think of me. You care what I
think of you. Of course this is a parody account.” Id.
148. THE YES MEN, http://theyesmen.org/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2011).
149. McSherry, supra note 111.
150. Chamber of Commerce Goes Green, THE YES MEN, http://theyesmen.org/hijinks/
chamber (last visited Mar. 2, 2011).
151. Lisa Lerer & Micael Calderone, CNBC, Reuters Fall for Climate Hoax, POLITICO
(Oct. 19, 2009, 2:44 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1009/28456.html.
152. Chamber of Commerce parody site, THE YES MEN, http://www.chamber-ofcommerce.us/090118tjd_prosperity.html (now defunct).
153. Chamber of Commerce Goes Green, THE YES MEN, supra 133.
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claims of infringement, dilution, cybersquatting, and false
154
advertising. On January 5, 2010, The Yes Men filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint (arguing that the Chamber’s lawsuit is designed
to punish core political speech, rather than to vindicate any actual
155
trademark harm) and a motion to stay discovery. As of publication
of this Note, the case is still pending in court.
B. Preclusion Concerns
156

Section 528.5 makes a point of not precluding any other claims,
which raises concerns about potential abuse by prosecutors and
plaintiffs. The statute provides harsh penalties; in addition to any
other civil remedy available, a person who suffers damage or loss
because of online impersonation may, within three years of discovery
157
by plaintiff,
bring a civil action against the violator for
compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief
158
159
related to costs incurred by plaintiff, reasonable attorney’s fees,
160
punitive or exemplary damages (upon showing of oppression, fraud,
161
or malice by defendant), and possible forfeiture of materials owned
162
by the defendant and used in conjunction with the impersonation.
Since this law does not preclude any other causes of action, plaintiffs
and prosecutors are almost certainly going to plead multiple,
simultaneous causes of action based on the same conduct, such that
this law could easily be used as a gap-filler, or lower threshold crime,

154. U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. Yes Men, CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT,
http://www.citmedialaw.org/threats/us-chamber-commerce-v-yes-men (last visited on Feb.
27, 2011). Court filings for Chamber of Commerce v. Sevrin are available at
http://dockets.justia.com/docket/district-of-columbia/dcdce/1:2009cv02014/139111/.
155. U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. Yes Men, CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT, http://
www.citmedialaw.org/threats/us-chamber-commerce-v-yes-men (last visited on Feb. 27,
2011).
156. CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5(f) (Deering 2012).
157. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(e)(5) (Deering 2012).
158. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(e)(1) (Deering 2012).
159. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(e)(2) (Deering 2012).
160. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(e)(4) (Deering 2012).
161. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (c) (Deering 2012), defining: (1) “Malice” as “conduct
which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct
which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or
safety of others;” (2) “Oppression” as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel
and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights;” and (3) “Fraud” as “an
intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the
defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of
property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.”
162. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(g) (Deering 2012).
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to find liability on a lower (noneconomic) harm standard for conduct
that would not have been actionable otherwise.

IV. Proposal
Ideally, the e-personation statute should be repealed—or
amended—by the legislature before anyone is tried under the law.
Despite the vagueness and overbreadth issues discussed above, a
reviewing court is unlikely to strike the law in its entirety because it is
not facially invalid—there is a core of conduct proscribed that is not
protected speech—and will instead attempt to interpret the statutory
language to more clearly define what it means to “credibly”
impersonate someone, and to set the threshold of “harming . . .
another person.”
California statutory interpretation doctrine states that where the
plain meaning of statutory text is insufficient to interpret it, courts
should look to the legislative intent behind the statute, then to other
extrinsic sources. If possible, all statutes relating to the same subject
(or having the same general purpose) should be read together so that
they harmonize and achieve a uniform and consistent legislative
163
When deciphering the intended meaning of a statutory
purpose.
phrase, courts should look to the same or similar language in related
164
statutes and give the same interpretation to the phrase at issue.
Because the plain meaning of the e-personation statute’s text is
unclear, this section will propose a narrower and more precise
understanding of the statute using the legislature’s intent, the
meaning of the statute as a whole, and similar language in analogous
statutes.
A. Limiting the Meaning of “Harming Another Person”

The phrase “harming . . . another person” is not clear on its face,
165
and the definition does not further elucidate its meaning. The use
of “harm” as an umbrella term suggests that the legislature intended
its meaning to be broader than the other enumerated intents
(intimidating, threatening or defrauding); but it is unclear whether it

163. 58 CAL JUR 3D STATUTES § 123; see also Kendall-Brief Co. v. Super. Ct., 131 Cal.
Rptr. 515, 518 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (citing Isobe v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 526
P.2d 528, 532 (Cal. 1974)).
164. 58 CAL JUR 3D STATUTES § 123; see In re Do Kyung K., 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 31, 36
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
165. The definition of “harm” is, “injury, loss or detriment.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 722 (7th ed. 1999).
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means emotional, reputational, physical or economic harm—or some
combination thereof. The provision in subsection (e) suggests that it
166
means at least economic harm.
Because the phrase “harm” does
not appear anywhere else in Chapter 8 of the Penal Code, reviewing
courts should consider similar language in related statutes.
Determining what interest the statute aims to protect is necessary
in resolving how harm should be defined. Using the analogous legal
claims summarized in Part II as a guide, there are three possible
approaches to defining “harm,” depending on the interest protected.
The first interpretation limits the protected interest, and consequently
harm, to the specific examples provided in the false personation
statute—exposing someone to actual or potential legal or financial
liability. The second interpretation broadens the protected interest to
include the privacy and identity of the individual impersonated such
that it presumes harm from the impersonation alone, much like
existing invasion of privacy torts. The third interpretation is
somewhere in between the first two and protects reputational and
emotional interests of impersonation victims (in the same manner as
IIED and defamation claims), and reflects the fact that the legislature
felt that the existing statutes were not sufficient to address the issue.
There are two bits of evidence supporting this first approach to
interpreting “harm” (specifically, limiting it to the specific examples
provided in the false personation statute—essentially exposing
someone to at least the possibility of legal or financial liability). The
first is that Senator Simitian, the author of the bill, stated that his
intent was to merely update the existing law to reflect the
167
The
technological advances made since it was enacted in 1892.
second is that doing so would maintain consistency with the
neighboring statutes, and help achieve a consistent legislative
168
purpose.
However, several differences in the application and scope of the
statutes suggest that this construction of the legislature’s intent is not
the most appropriate. First, under both the false personation and
identity theft statutes, the crime (i.e., harm) is only against the person
whose identity is assumed. The e-personation statute, on the other
hand, expands the crime to one against both the target of the false

166. CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5(e) (Deering 2012).
167. Simitian I, supra note 3.
168. The e-personation statute is codified in Chapter Eight of the Penal Code (False
Personation and Cheats §§ 528–539) between the false personation and identity theft
statutes.
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impersonation as well as against the person falsely impersonated. In
other words, the e-personation statute provides an additional civil
remedy for persons who are harmed, intimidated, threatened, or
defrauded by this impersonation, even if they are not the person
169
Another complication is that the existing statute
impersonated.
does not expressly exclude acts carried out over the Internet, so there
is nothing to suggest that the law would not already apply in that
170
context; further, if the intent was to update the existing statute, it
could have been amended to explicitly allow online impersonations.
Lastly, under the false personation statute, a plaintiff must establish,
in addition to the fake impersonation, an additional act that created
at least the possibility of bringing financial or legal liability upon the
victim or benefit to someone—either the impersonator or a third
party. The e-personation statute requires only intent to harm, not
actual (or potential) damage, like the existing statutes. For these
reasons, it’s reasonable to assume that the legislature intended a
different, or at least broader, meaning for “harm” than the one
outlined here. Therefore, to determine which of the other two
interpretations is correct, it is imperative to determine the interest
being protected—either the integrity of the impersonation victim’s
peace of mind (as in the privacy torts) or the victim’s reputation and
standing in his or her community in the wake of the impersonation (as
with defamation claims). Both options are considered in turn.
The fact that the e-personation statute requires only intent to
harm—whether or not someone is actually harmed, (or intimidated,
threatened, or defrauded) is irrelevant—supports the interpretation
that harm of being falsely impersonated is inextricable from the act;
the injury is in the violation of the identity and privacy of the
individual impersonated, the same principle behind the invasion of
privacy torts. The wrong inflicted by an invasion of privacy is a direct
injury to the plaintiff’s feelings and peace of mind, and compensation
is awarded for that injury, as opposed to any reputational damage
resulting from the invasion. For example, to recover under a false
light claim, a plaintiff must only prove that the defendant knowingly
(or recklessly) made and publicized a false representation which
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; actual injury is

169. ASSEM. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, supra note 126.
170. “For purposes of this chapter, ‘personal identifying information’ means any . . .
unique electronic data including information identification number assigned to the person,
address or routing code, telecommunication identifying information or access device.”
CAL. PENAL CODE § 530.55(b) (Deering 2012).

2012]

PARODY OR IDENTITY THEFT

303

171

irrelevant—it is presumed.
The strongest argument supporting
application of this standard is that it lowers the threshold of
actionable harm for the victim, which seemed to be what Sen.
Simitian wanted to do, and that courts balance this lower threshold of
harm against First Amendment protections for dissemination of
172
information and matters of publics interest.
However, this is
probably not the correct understanding for several reasons. First, the
harm only extends to the person whose identity is usurped, which may
or may not be the person to whom the harm was intended. Further,
while the false light claim is a relatively good fit for e-personation, the
misappropriation and right of publicity claims are fundamentally
about protecting victims’ economic interests. Finally, if adopted, it
would essentially make moot the issue of harm, since it would be
presumed by the intentional act of impersonation, and would
therefore make any impersonation actionable.
Therefore, the third construction, which interprets “harm” to
include both reputational and emotional harm is probably the most
accurate representation of the legislature’s intent. Defamation and
IIED are the legal causes of action to address reputational and
emotional harm; both of which logically follow from the discovery of
a malicious impersonation and the consequential damage done to
one’s reputation in its wake. They are also appropriate because
defamation law contains a broad exception for matters of public
interest and IIED claims require a high threshold of proof, the
adoption of which would help balance the statute with First
Amendment principles. However, there are still problems; these legal
theories, unlike e-personation, are predicated on the fact that harm
has actually occurred and that it was significant, or at least
measurable. Under the defamation statute, a plaintiff must establish,
in addition to publication and falsity, that the statement actually
injured the plaintiff’s reputation (with the specific exceptions of libel
per se). Under the IIED statute, the victim must establish, in
addition to the defendant’s intent, outrageous conduct and proximate
cause, that they were actually seriously emotionally distraught, and
physically manifested this distress. In contrast, the e-personation
statute requires only intent, and provides no minimum threshold for
the harm intended. Trying to devise a complementary standard here
is difficult because what matters with defamation and IIED is how

171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
172. Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 313 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001), review denied, (Mar. 27, 2002).
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much harm resulted, not how much was intended. For example,
imagine a situation in which someone creates a realistic fake
Facebook page for someone else without their consent and makes
false factual statements on it, but no one ever actually sees it, so
neither the intended target’s reputation or emotional state is harmed.
A lawsuit alleging defamation or IIED under those facts would
probably not succeed, but an e-personation claim well might. “Epersonators” who are caught will claim that they didn’t intend to
harm (threaten, intimidate, or defraud) anyone through their actions,
and intent is difficult to prove, especially without the linked
requirement of actual damage.
Despite these problems, this
interpretation is ultimately the most resasonable because it reflects
the fact that the legislature felt the actionable harm in the existing
statutes did not sufficiently address the problem, but does not create a
situation in which the minimum harm threshold would be negligible.
Even so, this interpreation sets up the statute for conflict with
173
established First Amendment principles.
B. Clearly Defining “Credibly Impersonate”

Even with clearer limits to the definition of “harm,” the problem
of what it means to “credibly” impersonate someone remains. The
main question that must be addressed regarding the standard of
credibility is the relationship between the individual impersonated
and who must find the impersonation credible. Because credibility is
such a nebulous and inherently subjective standard, courts should
create strict limits on the audience to whom the impersonation must
be believable. The statute bill does not define exactly who “another
person” is—i.e., to whom the impersonation must seem credible;
someone with personal knowledge of the impersonation victim or a
stranger who stumbles across the impersonation? This matters
because the degree to which someone knows the victim will guide
whether they find the impersonation credible or not. The two most
obvious limits would be based on relationship to the victim or
geographic boundaries of the audience. The problem with limiting
the audience geographically (say, to a 100-mile radius of the victim, or
his or her state of residence, etc.) is that the nature of the internet
makes those geographic distances meaningless.
Limiting the
audience by the strength of their relationship to the victim has its own
set of challenges: (1) where the line should be drawn; (2) how it
should even be evaluated in the first place; (3) whether there should
173. See discussion supra Section III.A.1.
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be some sliding scale reflecting the inverse relationship between
personal knowledge of the victim and believability of the
impersonation or just a bright line rule; and (4) whether future or
likely contacts should be considered.
Because he meaning of “credibly” is not clear on its face, its
definition in the statute does not shed much light on how it should be
174
and the word appears only once in Penal Code
applied either,
Chapter 8, courts should consider similar causes of action in
interpreting the phrase. One legal theory to consider is intentional
misrepresentation, which requires a minimum level of credibility for a
fraudulent represenation to be actionable. Under this statute and
related common law, the sophistication of the victim plays a role in
determining whether his or her reliance on the fraudulent statement
was reasonable; however, even an unsophisticated victim “may not
put faith in representations which are preposterous, or which are
shown by facts within his observation to be so patently and obviously
false that he must have closed his eyes to avoid discovery of the
175
A plain language reading of the e-personation statute,
truth.”
however, would allow an individual to bring a claim because a
stranger was fooled by an impersonation that (and regardless of
whether or not they relied on it), to anyone with personal knowledge
of the plaintiff, would not be credible. There are still people who
believe that a Nigerian prince would like to share his fortune with
176
177
them, if only they could wire him $5,000 to access it. The naïveté
of a few people should not override guaranteed protections for
speech.
Whether reliance on a statement is reasonable or not is generally
considered a matter of fact for a jury to decide. However, intentional
misrepresentation is a purely civil cause of action, so the fact that it is
more fact-specific is permissible. E-personation, on the other hand, is
a criminal offense and requires a higher standard of specificity. For
example, California’s counterfeit official document law provides some
specific, objective standards to help determine what would be
considered a plausible counterfeit document by limiting the meaning

174. “For purposes of this section, an impersonation is credible if another person
would reasonably believe, or did reasonably believe, that the defendant was or is the
person who was impersonated.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5(b) (Deering 2012).
175. Seeger v. Odell, 115 P.2d 977, 981 (Cal. 1941).
176. Anna Song, Woman Out $400K to ‘Nigerian Scam’ Con Artists, KATU.COM
(Nov. 21, 2008, 4:30 AM), http://www.katu.com/news/34292654.html.
177. Nigerian Scam, SNOPES.COM, http://www.snopes.com/fraud/advancefee/nigeria.
asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).
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of “purport” to “by virtue of the wording or appearance thereon could
reasonably deceive an ordinary person into believing that it is issued
178
by a government agency.” While those standards are not necessarily
transferrable to electronic platforms, similar objective standards as to
what would make an impersonation credible could help cure the
vagueness problem with that term.
Any objective standard must acknowledge the paradoxical fact
that the more outrageous, out of character, or damaging an
impersonation, the less credible it will be to anyone who actually
knows the victim, and the less likely it is to be believable. Guardino
himself articulated this idea in the newspaper article for which he was
interviewed: “It could have ruined my reputation .. . . Luckily, [the email recipients] know me well enough to know that e-mail was out of
179
character.”
A trademark infringement case for online impersonation from the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals illustrates how trademark law may
provide an appropriate paradigm for evaluating the credibility of
impersonation claims in this medium. In that case, the New York
Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) brought an action alleging that Gahary’s
unauthorized use of variations of the name of its CEO (Richard
Grasso) to post offensive messages to stock-related Internet bulletin
180
The court found
boards violated the Lanham Act and state law.
that the use was non-infringing because, “here, both the sheer
outrageousness of Gahary’s messages, as well as the particular place
he chose to post them, paradoxically bolster defendants’ claim that
181
Gahary’s intention could not have been to impersonate Grasso.”
According to the court, “the more participants there are on
RagingBull.com who use such celebrity screen names, the less likely
readers should be to confuse the author of a message posted under a
182
famous alias.” The Gahary opinion reiterated that the law is clear
that “First Amendment protections do not apply only to those who
183
speak clearly, whose jokes are funny, and whose parodies succeed,”
and that Supreme Court has long cautioned judges against the
temptation to act too readily as arbiters of taste or effectiveness

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 529.5 (a).
Koskey, supra note 6.
New York Stock Exch. v. Gahary, 196 F. Supp. 2d 401, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Id. at 406.
Id. at 411.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994).
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where expression such as parody is concerned.
While the Gahary
decision was about a public figure (whose name had arguably
acquired a secondary meaning), the principle behind it—that forum,
context, and content matter when determining credibility—is equally
applicable to private individuals.
While the Gahary court did not “engage in any systematic
analysis” of the likelihood of confusion question (because the parties’
briefs did not address it in sufficient detail), the opinion did discuss
some general points about the relationship between parody
185
While e-personation
impersonation and likelihood of confusion.
and trademark law protect different interests, the overlap between
the two on the issue of parody impersonation suggests the eight-factor
Polaroid test for likelihood of confusion (or selected elements of it)
might provide a fairly reasonable preliminary framework for
186
evaluating credibility objectively.
The Polaroid factors are: (1) the
strength of the mark, (2) the degree of similarity between the two
marks, (3) the proximity of the products, (4) the likelihood that the
prior owner will “bridge the gap,” (5) actual confusion, (6) the
defendant’s good faith in adopting its mark, (7) the quality of the
187
defendant’s product, and (8) the sophistication of the buyers. For
example, adopting some variation of first, second, fifth, sixth, and
eighth elements would be a good start. This sort of test would still
require courts (and juries) to not only evaluate these elements, but
also to balance them against each other—which does create potential
for abuse—but literally any objective standards to provide guidance
in determining what it means to “credibly impersonate another
person” would be an improvement over the current definition.
Adopting a two-tiered system for public and private figures
establishing credibility is another possible way to limit abuse of the epersonation statute by overly sensitive plaintiffs. Under this system,
public figures would have to prove that the offending impersonation
was especially credible, or more likely to be believed, than a private
figure would—in the same way that public figures must show actual
malice to prevail on a defamation claim. Public figures have more
resources at their disposal, like access to media and the public’s
interest and attention in the first place, to debunk the impersonation.

184. Id. at 582.
185. Gahary, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 409.
186. Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
187. Arrow Fastener Co. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 391 (2d Cir. 1995) citing
Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495.
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Further, as a social norm, satirical impersonations and parody
accounts of public figures on social networking sites have become
relatively common, to the extent that both Twitter and Facebook
offer “verified” accounts for certain public figures so that fans know
188
they are “following” or “liking” the real thing, not an imposter.
Ultimately, the crux of the problem with a standard of credible
impersonation online is that when you represent yourself through the
facets of the Internet that come into play here (e.g., a social
networking or media site, forum chat, email address, blog, or
website), there is no “official” stamp of approval for your identity
because the vast majority of hosting platforms do not authenticate
users’ identities. In other words, on the Internet, nobody knows
189
you’re a dog. Moreover, the hosting website and platforms have no
feasible way to authenticate the identities of their users. California’s
identity theft statute limits itself to any document purporting to be
190
government-issued identification, or birth or baptism certificate.
because we as a society rely on official, government-issued
documentation to verify identity as opposed to allowing people to
make up their own. No store selling alcohol will take someone
claiming to be 21 at their word, nor will they accept a homemade
identity card as proof of legal age. This inability to authenticate
“real-world” identity means that people who use the Internet should
be, and largely are, skeptical that people are not who they represent
191
themselves to be.
Senator Simitian is correct that malicious online impersonation is
a real and growing problem. However, privately owned social media
hosting platforms are better equipped to deal with the problem than
the government. For one thing, private platforms are in a far better
position to determine what it means to “credibly impersonate”
someone because they are more aware of the telling contextual signs
of what would make an impersonation credible on their particular

188. About Verified Accounts, TWITTER, http://support.twitter.com/groups/31-twitterbasics/topics/111-features/articles/119135-about-verified-accounts (last visited Feb. 15,
2012); Josh Constine, Facebook Launches Verified Accounts and Pseudonyms,
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 15, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/02/15/facebook-verifiedaccounts-alternate-names/.
189. Peter Steiner, On the Internet, Nobody Knows You’re a Dog, THE NEW YORKER,
July 5, 1993, at 61 (cartoon) available at http://www.unc.edu/depts/jomc/
academics/dri/idog.html.
190. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 529a, 529.5 (a) (Deering 2012).
191. For example, journalists have developed guides to help their peers authenticate
tweets. See Craig Kanalley, How to Verify a Tweet, TWITTERJOURNALISM.COM, (Jun. 25,
2009) http://www.twitterjournalism.com/2009/06/25/how-to-verify-a-tweet/.
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platform. Further, while Section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act (“CDA”) immunizes providers and users of an “interactive
computer service” who publish information provided by others,
essentially prohibiting the government from requiring private
192
platforms to monitor and be held liable for content posted on them,
Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, Yahoo!, and MySpace (among others)
have implemented impersonation policies and mechanisms for those
whose identities have been stolen to flag the offending profile and
193
request its removal.
The fact that these platforms have voluntarily
established impersonation policies shows that they take the problem
seriously even in the absence of legal obligation. But most
importantly, if private companies, in implementing their policies, err
on the side of caution, they cannot be sued for violating free speech.
This principle is illustrated in the contrast between Twitter’s
194
195
treatment of the @ceoSteveJobs and @BPGlobalPR accounts.
The @BPBlobal PR account, which sprung up in the wake of the
Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion in the Gulf of Mexico in April
2010, churned out satirical tweets such as, “Sadly we can no longer
196
certify our oil as Dolphin Safe,” and “You know what they say
about the ocean... Once it goes black it never goes back! JOKING197
the water is brown,” and “@Jesus walked on water and soon you
198
can too! (Please pray for BP, we’re losing a lot of oil).” Although a
spokesperson for British Petroleum stated that it was clear the
199
account was a parody, many people were confused and outraged by
200
Twitter did not take any action
the account’s sardonic tweets.
against the BPGlobal PR account. In contrast, Twitter required the
@ceoSteve Jobs account to change its name (at the request of Apple)

192. 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(1).
193. Jacob Share, Reference: Impersonation Policies for Top Social Networks,
BRANDING
BLOG,
(Nov.
6,
2009,
5:15
AM)
PERSONAL
http://www.personalbrandingblog.com/reference-impersonation-policies-for-top-socialnetworks/.
194. See supra, notes 142-47.
195. BP Global PR Account Page, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/#!/BPGlobalPR.
196. Twitter status, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/#!/bpglobalpr/status/14456229115.
197. Twitter status, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/#!/BPGlobalPR/status/14519730735.
198. Twitter status, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/#!/BPGlobalPR/status/14639541783.
199. SciTechBlog, Fake BP Twitter Feed Mocks Company Over Oil Spill, CNN.com
(May 26, 2010) http://scitech.blogs.cnn.com/2010/05/26/fake-bp-twitter-feed-mockscompany-over-oil-spill/.
200. Juli Weiner, Somehow, the Internet Appears Not to Understand “BPGlobalPR”
Twitter is a Joke, VF Daily (May 24, 2010, 12:45 PM) http://www.vanityfair.com/
online/daily/2010/05/somehow-the-internet-appears-not-to-understand-bpglobalpr-twitteris-a-joke.
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to “@fakeSteveJobs” just days after the e-personation law went into
201
effect (the account was eventually deleted after the passing of Steve
Jobs in October 2011). The similarities between the two accounts is
striking, and the disparate treatment can be chalked up to only one
thing: Apple’s request to have the account parodying its CEO
account shut down, days after the e-personation statute’s enactment.
This example also illustrates the validity of the concern that
companies will use the statute as an opportunity to stifle criticism and
traditionally protected commentary.

V. Conclusion
While this law is an admirable attempt to combat cyberbullying,
digital identity theft, and online harassment, it is too broadly and
vaguely written. The behavior that is unquestionably not protected is
already addressed by other statutes with established bodies of law
behind them (and no reason to think they are not applicable in the
digital world), while the conduct that is possibly protected is best
addressed by the privately owned and managed platforms that host it.
Courts have long recognized that “where a vague statute ‘abut[s]
upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,’ it ‘operates
to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms.’ Uncertain meanings
inevitably lead citizens to ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone’ . . .
202
than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.”
Ultimately, there are already effective laws on the books to deter
all of the truly harmful behavior the e-personation law is intended to
address—in particular, various forms of impersonation, defamation,
identity theft, intimidation, harassment, fraud, and invasion of
privacy. Senator Simitian believes the e-personation statute is needed
to extend those crimes to cover the use of “Internet Web sites” and
“other electronic means,” but there is no reason to believe that the
technology used is any bar to prosecutions under existing law—in
fact, the use of electronic communications to commit the acts would
extend the possible criminal laws that apply, since electronic
communications are generally considered interstate commerce and
thus subject to federal as well as state laws.
Another existing statute, cyberstalking, has proved to be
particularly effective against some instances of online impersonation.
The Los Angeles District Attorney’s office convicted a man of
201. Alexia Tsotsis, Apple Goes After The Parody @CeoSteveJobs Twitter Account,
TECHCRUNCH, Jan. 6, 2011, http://techcrunch.com/2011/01/06/apple-twitter/.
202. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972).
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violating California’s cyberstalking laws when he falsely
impersonated a woman who had rejected his romantic advances in
203
various chat rooms. Statutes such as these are more appropriate to
bring suit and prosecute under because they have established
standards and well-defined protected interests to guide courts in their
application.
In short, the e-personation statute covers very little new behavior,
but, because of ambiguous and broad language, could be used as a
tool to intimidate those engaging in protected speech but without the
resources to defend themselves against litigious plaintiffs and
overzealous prosecutors eager to set an example. Even with a saving
construction of the term “harm,” the question of what, exactly, it
means to “credibly impersonate” someone on the Internet is fatal.
For an impersonation to be damaging would, in most cases, mean that
it was also not credible; the inverse relationship between the two
concepts makes the law so narrowly applicable to the proscribed
conduct that to have any teeth, its terms must be construed so broadly
that they butt up against protected speech.
The e-personation statute should have been written more
specifically to target the types of activities it wants to prohibit and
exclude the constitutionally protected activities it does target. Given
the Court’s trend of expanding the scope of recognized protected
speech, it is likely that this law, if properly challenged, will fail on
First Amendment grounds. There are two feasible solutions here.
The first is to go back to the drawing board and come up with an
objective set of metrics (similar to those in the identity theft statute or
trademark likelihood of confusion test) that could be applied to
evaluate credibility. The alternative is to reinstate the old system, in
which individuals who are being impersonated report the offending
profile directly to the platform to have it removed, then, if warranted,
sue the profile’s creator for defamation, invasion of privacy,
cyberbullying, (or any of the other applicable causes of action).

203. He posed as the woman in a number of chat rooms telling other “chatters” that
she fantasized about being raped. He provided her phone number and address so that
people wishing to fulfill her fantasy could actually do so. On at least six occasions,
sometimes in the middle of the night, men knocked on the woman’s door saying they
wanted to rape her. The former security guard pleaded guilty in April 1999 to one count
of stalking and three counts of solicitation of sexual assault. He faces up to six years in
prison. 1999 Report on Cyberstalking: A New Challenge for Law Enforcement and
Industry, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Aug. 1999), http://www.justice.gov
/criminal/cybercrime/cyberstalking.htm (last updated Feb. 7, 2003).
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There is bad behavior to deter, but this law as it stands currently is
too sloppily drafted to pass constitutional muster.

